Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness by Falbo, Arianna
1 
 
Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness  
 
Arianna Falbo 
arianna_falbo@brown.edu   
 
Forthcoming in Hypatia.  
 
Abstract: This paper argues that a fairly widespread approach to hermeneutical 
injustice—what I call the lacuna-centered analysis—is incomplete. This analysis fails to 
capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which does not result from 
lacunae or a lack of hermeneutical resources, but instead from the overabundance of 
distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt 
the application of an available and more accurate hermeneutical resource. In its place, 
I begin to develop a more expansive framework for theorizing about hermeneutical 
injustice, which better respects the complex relationship between hermeneutical 




Scholarship on epistemic injustice has highlighted the importance of hermeneutical 
resources in facilitating the intelligibility of socially significant experiences.<1> 
Notably, Miranda Fricker (2007) has defended a species of epistemic harm that she 
calls hermeneutical injustice. On her analysis, hermeneutical injustice arises when one 
attempts to make a socially significant experience intelligible, but can’t because one 
lacks the required hermeneutical tools needed to do so. There is a gap in the inventory 
of hermeneutical resources which are used to render important social experiences 
intelligible, where this gap is the result of an injustice in the background social 
methods used to determine hermeneutical resources (Fricker 2006, 2007, 2016, 2017). 
Despite various points of disagreement and further developments concerning 
Fricker’s analysis, one key assumption appears to have gained a fairly widespread 
acceptance in the literature. This is that hermeneutical injustice requires a lacuna in the 
stock of hermeneutical resources used to interpret socially significant experiences.<2> 
We can formulate this requirement more precisely as follows.  
The Lacuna Requirement 
Hermeneutical injustice requires a lacuna in the hermeneutical repertoire that 




The Lacuna Requirement imposes a necessary condition on the occurrence of a 
hermeneutical injustice. A hermeneutical resource is absent from the hermeneutical 
repertoire and had the needed concept been available—had this lacuna been filled—
the injustice would no longer persist.  
In what follows, I argue that a lacuna-centered approach to hermeneutical injustice 
is incomplete. The Lacuna Requirement entails an overly narrow analysis of 
hermeneutical injustice and, as a result, it fails to cover an important species of 
hermeneutical injustice that merits more careful investigation. In particular, this 
approach fails to recognize a species of hermeneutical injustice that doesn’t result from 
a dearth of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and 
oppressive concepts which function to crowd out, defeat, or pre-empt the application 
of an available and more accurate concept.  Focusing on cases of hermeneutical 
injustice without hermeneutical lacunae helps to make salient important social 
dimensions of this epistemic injustice. It highlights the need for not only novel 
hermeneutical resources—that is, the need to fill in hermeneutical gaps—but also the 
importance of acknowledging how those same resources are integrated into extant 
conceptual frameworks within an overarching social milieu.  
In the next section, I explain the lacuna-centered approach to hermeneutical 
injustice in more detail. Following, I argue that in addition to facilitating intelligibility, 
hermeneutical resources also have crucial productive functions—they serve to organize 
and coordinate individuals within a social milieu. In light of this, I defend cases of 
hermeneutical injustice which don’t arise from a conceptual lack and thus motivate 
the need for a more expansive framework. Lastly, I begin to develop a broader analysis 
for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice and highlight the advantages of adopting 
this framework over a lacuna-centered approach. The expansive framework 
recognizes two distinct types of hermeneutical injustice: what I call positive and 
negative hermeneutical injustice.<3> I close by sketching an approach to hermeneutical 
justice that naturally flows out of this more expansive framework.  
 
 
2. The Lacuna-Centered Analysis   
Fricker draws our attention to the emergence of the concept sexual harassment in the 
early 1970s. She details the case of Carmita Wood, who quit her job at Cornell 
University’s Nuclear Physics Department after experiencing persistent and unwanted 
sexual advances from her boss. He would “jiggle his crotch” while passing her desk 
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and would “deliberately brush against her breasts while reaching for some papers” 
(Fricker 2007, 150). <4> When applying for unemployment insurance Wood was 
required to explain why she had quit, but she found herself at a loss for words. It 
wasn’t shameless flirting or mere office humor that caused her to leave; what she 
experienced was flat-out sexual harassment. But, since this concept had yet to make 
its way into collective understanding—let alone onto unemployment insurance 
forms—Wood couldn’t articulate her experience as such. She reported that she had 
quit for “personal reasons” and was subsequently denied insurance. 
Fricker describes Wood’s case as a paradigmatic instance of hermeneutical 
injustice. She says: “Here is a story about how extant collective hermeneutical 
resources can have a lacuna where the name of a distinctive social experience should 
be” (2007, 150-151). <5> Accordingly, the hermeneutical injustice Wood faced resulted 
from a gap in the available stock of hermeneutical resources; there was a lacuna where 
the concept sexual harassment should have been. Moreover, this lacuna is a 
consequence of an injustice in the background social methods which are used to 
determine hermeneutical resources. In Fricker’s terminology, women like Wood faced 
hermeneutical marginalization: they were not equitably included in the political and 
legal contexts which serve to define the conditions for unemployment.  
According to this approach, the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice concerns 
a lack of intelligibility resulting from one’s hermeneutical marginalization. Fricker 
says: “the subject is rendered unable to make communicatively intelligible something 
which it is particularly in his or her interests to be able to render intelligible”(Fricker 
2007, 162). The secondary harms of hermeneutical injustice, Fricker argues, concern 
the downstream negative consequences which result from this unintelligibility. In 
Wood’s case, this includes, among other things, her being denied unemployment 
insurance as well as her increased levels of stress and anxiety.  
While the case of Carmita Wood and the emergence of the concept sexual harassment 
has now become the stock example of hermeneutical injustice in the literature, it’s 
important to highlight that this injustice, as it’s understood on a lacuna-centered 
model, can be illustrated using many other examples. Consider the recent emergence 
of the concept genderqueer as a hermeneutical resource for understanding and giving 
recognition to the identities of nonbinary people. Robin Dembroff (2020) argues that: 
...without the resources for understanding nonbinary gender identities, we 
sustain a conceptual lacuna surrounding nonbinary persons. This lacuna does 
not only reflect a gap in philosophical understanding: it contributes to a 
hermeneutical injustice that arises from the failure to spread and charitably 
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analyze the concepts and practices underlying nonbinary classifications. 
(Dembroff 2020, 2, italics added.) 
Another example is the concept of disability pride as it emerged in the disability rights 
movement in the 1960s. Elizabeth Barnes (2016) has discussed the importance of this 
concept in challenging dominant associations of disability with tragedy, inferiority, 
and shame. Barnes says: 
As disabled people, we are forever being told that there is something about 
our bodies that is lacking, that is less than. Disability pride says it doesn’t 
have to be that way. Disability pride says that we may have minority bodies, 
but we don’t have—we refuse to have—tragic bodies. (Barnes 2016, 186)  
For disabled and non-disabled people alike, Barnes argues that the concept of disability 
pride has helped to make it intelligible that disability can be the subject of genuine 
pride and celebration.   
 Recent scholarship has also highlighted significant limitations of Fricker’s 
analysis and has further expanded upon it. Gaile Pohlhaus (2011) develops the 
valuable notion of willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly 
situated individuals refuse to adopt the hermeneutical resources of marginalized 
groups. Willful hermeneutical ignorance functions to maintain hermeneutical gaps at 
the inter-communal level—that is, while such resources may be utilized, even widely, 
among members of one’s own community or social group (i.e. they are intra-
communally available), lacunae nevertheless persist at the level of the dominant or 
collective hermeneutical repertoire, which is used to interpret and communicate one’s 
experiences across social groups more broadly.<6> 
 Building upon the work of Pohlhaus (2011) and others, Kristie Dotson (2012) has 
developed an analysis of contributory injustice. This is an epistemic injustice resulting 
from willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly situated 
individuals choose to employ prejudiced hermeneutical resources, when they could 
have used more accurate resources which have already been developed by those in 
marginalized communities. Contributory injustice concerns the refusal among those 
in dominant positions to allow marginalized individuals to exercise their epistemic 
agency by contributing to the dominant hermeneutical repertoire. As a result, 
hermeneutical gaps persist within the dominant (or inter-communal) hermeneutical 
inventory.  
Relatedly, Luvell Anderson (2017) has analyzed how hermeneutical gaps may be 
actively cultivated through the suppression of extant hermeneutical resources. 
Anderson gives the example of post-racial movements aimed at eradicating and 
“moving beyond race.” Attempts to promote color-blind politics, he argues, function 
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to erase the concept race and the indispensable role it has in understanding the 
experiences of people of color (Anderson 2017, 145-146). Anderson thus enriches the 
lacuna-centered approach to hermeneutical injustice by illustrating how some lacunae 
are actively procured by the removal of available hermeneutical resources.  
A common thread that unites these otherwise distinct analyses is an adherence to a 
lacunae-centered framework for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. While 
Anderson highlights a different way for hermeneutical gaps to emerge, lacunae 
feature prominently on his analysis. And while Dotson and Pohlhaus articulate how 
needed hermeneutical resources may be available and utilized within marginalized 
communities, they highlight how lacunae may persist more broadly, within the stock 
of dominant or collective conceptual resources used to communicate across social 
groups. Hence, here too we find a similar background assumption, namely, The 
Lacuna Requirement. 
A lacuna-centered approach has also influenced prominent conceptions of 
hermeneutical justice. Fricker discusses the overcoming of hermeneutical injustice in the 
case of Wendy Stanford, a woman who suffered from postnatal depression after the 
birth of her child in the 1960s, prior to the emergence of the concept postnatal depression. 
She describes Stanford’s experience during a consciousness raising session as follows.  
Wendy Sanford’s moment of truth seems to be not simply a hermeneutical 
breakthrough for her and for the other women present, but also a moment 
in which some kind of epistemic injustice is overcome…If we can substantiate 
this intuition, then we shall see that the area of hermeneutical gloom with 
which she had lived up until that life-changing forty-five minutes constituted a 
wrong done to her in her capacity as a knower, and was thus a specific sort 
of epistemic injustice–a hermeneutical injustice.” (Fricker 2007, 149, italics 
added). 
Influenced by a lacuna-centered model, a great importance is routinely placed upon 
the initial naming and subsequent intelligibility that hermeneutical resources help to 
facilitate (cf. McKinnon 2016, 441, and Davis 2018, 720). If hermeneutical injustice 
results from lacunae, the thought goes, then hermeneutical justice naturally calls for 
hermeneutical plugs, as it were, concepts which serve to fill in the gaps.  
To summarize thus far: a lacuna-centered framework proposes that hermeneutical 
injustice stems from one’s inability to make a significant social experience intelligible 
(to oneself or to others) owing to a gap in the stock of hermeneutical resources, where 
this gap is a result of hermeneutical marginalization. According to this approach, 
hermeneutical injustice is perpetuated by the persistence and/or cultivation of 
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hermeneutical lacunae—had such lacunae been filled (intra and inter-communally), 
hermeneutical injustice would be overcome.   
Although a lacuna-centered framework for theorizing about hermeneutical 
injustice has been widely adopted and endorsed across much of the recent literature, 
I will now argue that it’s incomplete and that a more expansive framework is needed. 
The lacuna-centered model is overly narrow and, as a result, it fails to capture an 
important species of hermeneutical injustice that doesn’t arise from a hermeneutical 
gap.   
 
 
3. The Productive Function of Hermeneutical Resources  
 
In order to motivate a more expansive framework, and in order to explain a species of 
hermeneutical injustice without lacunae, it is important to first make salient the 
productive function and power of hermeneutical resources. This idea is prominent in 
the pioneering work of Patricia Hill Collins (1986, 1990), in particular, her notion of a 
controlling image.<7> According to Collins’ analysis, controlling images function to 
distort social reality by perpetuating oppressive stereotypes and by fueling the 
normalization of unjust social arrangements. Collins says: 
[C]ontrolling images are designed to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other 
forms of social injustice appear to be natural, normal, and inevitable parts of 
everyday life. (Collins 1990, 76-77) 
Collins analyzes a number of controlling images that have been used to distort the 
experiences of Black women, thereby contributing to their oppression. These include 
concepts such as the welfare queen, matriarch, jezebel, and mammy. Collins discusses the 
mammy controlling image as follows.   
[T]he faithful, obedient domestic servant. Created to justify the economic 
exploitation of house slaves and sustained to explain Black women’s long-
standing restriction to domestic service, the mammy image represents the 
normative yardstick used to evaluate all Black women’s behaviour. By loving, 
nurturing, and caring for her White “family” better than her own, the 
mammy symbolized the dominant group’s perceptions of the ideal Black 
female relationship to elite White male power. Even though she may be well 
loved and may wield considerable authority in her White “family,” the 




The controlling image of the mammy functions to limit Black women’s participation in 
the hermeneutical practices of influential meaning making by relegating them to 
domestic household roles.<8> The mammy controlling image supports the construction 
and normalization of Black women as complacent domestic workers, and functions to 
place them into submissive roles with expectant behaviours. Crucially, Collins argues 
that controlling images function as “normative yardsticks”—they help to set the terms 
for what counts as an appropriate allocation of praise or blame. Accordingly, Black 
women who transgress and seek work outside of the domestic roles associated with 
the mammy image are prone to be interpreted as violating the prescriptions and roles 
imposed upon them via this social categorization.  
The productive potential of hermeneutical resources is also salient in Lynne 
Tirrell’s (2012) work on epithets. Tirrell examines the use of “inyenzi” (cockroach) and 
“inzoka” (snake) by Hutu soldiers to describe Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide. 
She describes these epithets as exhibiting the following key features: they mark 
insider/outsider relations, they attribute negative properties to their target (which are 
presumed to be essential to them), they are embedded in social networks of 
subordination and oppression, they set boundaries for what constitutes permissible 
behaviour towards the target, and they are action-engendering insofar as they 
facilitate and purport to justify non-linguistic behaviours. The widespread use of these 
epithets, Tirrell argues, contributed greatly to dehumanization of Tutsis and the 
legitimization of horrific acts of violence against them (Tirrell 2012, 192-193).<9> 
Additionally, Katharine Jenkins (2020) has recently developed an analysis of 
ontic injustice, a kind of injustice that concerns a wrong done to one in virtue of being 
constructed as a member of a particular social kind. Jenkins defines ontic injustice as 
follows.  
An individual suffers ontic injustice if and only if they are socially 
constructed as a member of a certain social kind where that construction 
consists, at least in part, of their being subjected to a set of social constraints 
and enablements that is wrongful to them. (Jenkins 2020, 191, italics added.)  
The notion of ontic injustice helps to further shed light upon the productive function 
and power that conceptual resources can have. Jenkins considers the example of being 
socially constructed as belonging to the category wife in England before 1991, prior to 
the emergence of marital rape laws. As such, under the law, wives in England were 
denied full control over who had sexual access to their bodies. Jenkins argues that 
those who were socially constructed as belonging to the category wife during this time 
were morally wrong, given the constraints and enablements that this social 
categorization imposed upon them––they faced a kind of ontic injustice.  
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Prevailing analyses of hermeneutical injustice have understood the function 
and value of hermeneutical resources as primarily interpretive—hermeneutical 
resources help to facilitate the intelligibility of socially significant experiences. 
However, hermeneutical resources can do so much more than render social 
experiences intelligible. They often serve crucial productive functions as well: they 
organize members of society and cast them into certain roles and relations with 
expectant behaviours. Collins’ discussion of controlling images, Tirrell’s work on 
epithets, and Jenkins’ discussion of ontic injustice, help to reveal an overly narrow 
focus across much of the literature on hermeneutical injustice by highlighting the 
productive dimensions of conceptual resources.  
In addition to the value of intelligibility we ought to also recognize the productive 
function of hermeneutical resources, namely, the significant value and potential they 
have in helping to support the equitable coordination and organization of members of 
society (Haslanger 2020a, 14-15). Thus, an analysis of hermeneutical injustice must 
acknowledge that some concepts have serious productive power—that they can serve 
to sustain, normalize, and justify oppressive social practices and unjust social 
arrangements. Once the productive function of hermeneutical resources is salient, this 
opens the door to theorizing about hermeneutical injustice in a more comprehensive 
and more deeply social way; it draws our attention to the complex relationship 
between hermeneutical resources and the broader social and political environments 
in which they are embedded and implemented.   
A lacuna-centred approach toward hermeneutical injustice fails to appreciate the 
potential for hermeneutical injustice to manifest not just from a dearth in conceptual 
resources, but also from the way in which concepts interact with each other given 
pervasive cultural assumptions and social conventions. In other words, it is not just 
that we need to fill in hermeneutical gaps, but we also need to consider how newly 
introduced concepts are operationalized and how they cohere (or fail to cohere) with 
other extant concepts when situated within a social milieu. Hermeneutical resources 
are not introduced to collective understanding in a vacuum, but against the backdrop 
of longstanding and often deeply rooted conceptual schemes—schemes that too often 
include distorting concepts and oppressive controlling images. Zooming out and 
taking a broader perspective on hermeneutical injustice, namely, a perspective which 
acknowledges the interpretive as well as the productive value of hermeneutical 
resources, is vital not only to understand the myriad ways in which hermeneutical 






4. Hermeneutical Clash 
 
Consider the following case of what we might call a hermeneutical clash. First, 
consider the concept golden boy. What—or who—comes to mind? Most likely the 
following: this person is probably white, cis, heterosexual, non-disabled, hyper 
privileged, athletic, popular, educated (perhaps at an elite institution), some might 
describe him as “all-American”, and so on. Next, consider the concept rapist. This 
concept has been operative in collective understanding for decades. In mainstream 
media, rapists are typically construed as creeps, loners, strangers, deviants, monsters, 
or savage animals. (Gray 2016, Murphy 2017, O’Hara 2016, and Schwark 2017). <10>  
Now ask yourself: what happens when the so-called “golden boy”—in all his glory 
and esteem—is accused of rape? That is, what happens when we attempt to apply the 
concept rapist to someone who seamlessly fits the profile of a golden boy? This is 
precisely what happened in the case of Brock Turner, a former student-athlete at 
Stanford University who was discovered raping an unconscious woman, who we now 
know to be Chanel Miller, behind a dumpster.<11> Turner is your quintessential 
golden boy. This is more than apparent in his father’s letter to Judge Persky, the judge 
who presided over his case. In the letter, Turner’s father writes that:    
Brock has an inner strength and fortitude that is beyond anything I have ever 
seen. This was no doubt honed over the many years of competitive 
swimming…Brock has always been an extremely dedicated person whether 
it was academics, sports, or developing and maintaining friendships and 
relationships…Brock was equally talented in athletics participating in 
baseball, basketball, and swimming.<12>  
The majority of the letter discusses Turner’s athletic and academic achievements. But 
one might ask, why in the world would this ever be relevant to Turner’s acquittal? 
Here’s why. Turner’s father is attempting to probe a distorting image of Brock as a 
golden boy: the kind of kid who could do no wrong and, hence, who clearly couldn’t 
be guilty of the felony sexual assault charges against him. Furthermore, in this case 
the golden boy image is contrasted with the distorting, yet all too common, portrayal of 
a rapist as a creepy stranger, loner, monster, or animal.  
In another letter to Judge Persky, Turner’s childhood friend, Leslie Rasmussen, 
writes that: “Brock is not a monster. He’s the furthest thing from anything like that” 
(Paiella 2016, italics added).  Judge Persky seems to have sympathized. He sentenced 
Turner to a meagre six months in jail, out of a possible fourteen. Turner was released 
on probation after serving just three months.  
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This is not a one-off case. In 2017, a sixteen-year-old boy was charged with raping 
a heavily intoxicated girl who had been noticeably slurring her words. The boy had 
filmed himself having sex with her and afterwards sent the video to his friends along 
with a text which read: “When your first time having sex is rape” (Ferré-Sadurní 2019).  
Judge Troiano denied the prosecutor’s motion to have the boy tried as an adult. He 
had justified this decision by citing the fact that the boy “comes from a good family,” 
that he is “clearly a candidate for not just college but probably for a good college,” and 
that he was an Eagle Scout—the highest rank achievable in the Boy Scouts of America 
(Mosbergen 2019). As before, we find that the golden boy image directly clashes with 
the stereotypical image of a rapist as a deviant and debased monster, stranger, creep, 
or loner.  
Kate Manne (2017) discusses the common inference pattern made in such cases as 
follows.  
1. Golden boys are not rapists. 
2. So-and-so is a golden boy. 
3. Therefore, so-and-so is not a rapist. 
Similarly: 
1. Rapists are monsters. 
2. So-and-so is not a monster. 
3. Therefore, so-and-so is not a rapist. (Manne 2017, 198)  
Manne argues that exonerating narratives—such as the “golden boy” narrative—
function to excessively inflate the credibility of men who commit violent misogynistic 
acts against women, and thereby deflates the credibility of women who speak out 
against them. In cases of he said/she said testimony there is only a fixed amount of 
credibility to go around, and believing him, directly discredits her as either lying or 
confused (and vice versa). <13> 
In her recent memoir, Miller, the survivor from the Turner case, describes how 
the media commonly depicted Turner as having been “misconstrued as a criminal.” 
She discusses how even well after his conviction many refused to admit the fact that 
Turner had sexually assaulted her. She says:  
The stories about Brock running from police with a backpack full of Coors, 
rubbing up on girls, smoking weed, tripping on acid, photographing tits, 
were all absent from the image his loved ones and the media projected. The 
Washington Post called him squeaky clean and baby-faced, a rosy-cheeked 
cherub. The letter writers insisted he was misconstrued as a criminal. They called 
him an innocent man, fighting for his freedom.. . . Gracious, caring, talented. 
Humble, responsible, trustworthy. Wouldn’t hurt a fly. Even after the conviction, 
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they believed he remained entitled to impunity. Their support was 
unwavering, they refused to call it assault, only called it the horrible mess, this 
unfortunate situation. (Miller 2019, 463)<14> 
The hermeneutical clash between the concept rapist and the concept golden boy is also 
salient in the seemingly paradoxical statements in a letter from Leslie Rasmussen, 
Turner’s friend. 
[R]ape on campuses isn’t always because people are rapists…This is completely 
different from a woman getting kidnapped and raped as she is walking to 
her car in a parking lot. That is a rapist. These are not rapists. These are idiot 
boys and girls having too much to drink and not being aware of their 
surroundings and having clouded judgement. (Paiella 2016, italics added.) 
When privileged men (typically, cis, white, heterosexual, upper class, etc.) commit acts 
of violence against women, there is a persistent tendency to explain away their 
behaviour as an aberration or deviation from one’s “normal” or “true” character—
Turner might have done this, but he isn’t a rapist. <15> 
Reflecting upon these cases helps to uncover an important, yet under-explored, 
species of hermeneutical injustice. The case of Carmita Wood is strikingly different 
from the case of Chanel Miller. In the former case, the concept sexual harassment was 
wholly absent from the collective hermeneutical repertoire—it wasn’t available for use 
within social, political, or legal settings in general. In the latter case, the concept rapist 
was widely available and, importantly, was present within legal settings. However, 
there is a crucial difference between a concept being sufficiently acquired and broadly 
disseminated such that it occupies a place in the collective stock of hermeneutical 
resources, and its actually being effectively operationalized such that it is utilized and 
accurately applied in high-stakes cases where it genuinely describes social reality. For 
example, the concept rapist being readily applied to actual perpetrators of rape in a 
legal setting, especially in the face of overwhelming evidence.  
 
5. Conceptual Acquisition and Conceptual Aptness  
 
While a needed concept might exist in the hermeneutical inventory at large (as 
the concept rapist did in the previous example), in particular social contexts a concept’s 
application might be severely limited. And, as a result, its productive function and 
power is thwarted—it is restricted in its ability to robustly latch on to the social world 
in a way that is conducive to stimulating social and political change.  Such cases call 
our attention to the complex ways in which concepts are integrated into extant 
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conceptual frameworks and the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical 
resources and the broader social milieu in which they are embedded.   
The introduction and sheer presence of a concept within the dominant 
hermeneutical repertoire, and more specifically, one’s being conceptually competent 
with some concept, is not enough to ensure that the concept will be accurately 
deployed in socially significant contexts. There is thus a need to sharply distinguish 
between the initial processing or acquisition conditions of a hermeneutical resource, on 
the one hand, and its proper application conditions, on the other. When a concept is 
initially grasped, one thereby becomes (more or less) conceptually competent with the 
concept. However, conceptual competence does not always, and more often does not, 
translate into a perfect ability to identify all instances where the concept accurately 
applies.  
Consider the following toy example. One might be competent with the concept 
fruit yet fail to accurately identify an avocado as a fruit. Common associations of fruit 
with sweetness and avocados with savoury cooking may hinder one’s ability to 
properly classify an avocado as a fruit. Yet, it’s clear that one can still retain their 
conceptual competence, even to a very high degree, despite failing to accurately apply 
the concept in all cases. We could imagine someone saying: “Of course I know what 
fruit is...I just didn’t know that was a fruit.” If conceptual competence demands the 
ability to accurately apply a concept in each and every instance, then there would be 
very few concepts with which one was genuinely competent.<16> 
Jack Balkin (1990) discusses how certain concepts, while falling short of being 
outright logically contradictory, can nonetheless be rendered opposites when 
embedded into certain social contexts; he calls such cases nested oppositions and gives 
the following examples.  
If we say that red and green are opposite colors in a traffic light, we are not 
saying that they logically contradict each other. Rather, they are opposed 
with respect to the meanings these colors are given in traffic signals. The 
context of conventions concerning traffic signals makes them opposites. In 
another context, they may be seen as similar to each other. For example, red 
and green are both colors of the natural spectrum, or colors associated with 
Christmas, while lavender and brown are not. Thus red and green are seen 
as different in some contexts, and are seen as having similar properties in 
others. (Balkin 1990, 6-7)  
We can apply Balkin’s insights to cases of hermeneutical injustice without lacunae. 
For example, in a social milieu where patriarchal ideology and its attendant 
conventions and social practise, along with other overlapping systems of oppression, 
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are prevalent, the golden boy concept is prone to be interpreted as clashing or as in 
opposition to the bad boy, or the scoundrel. And, furthermore, in such social settings 
rapists are readily characterized as creepy strangers, recluse outsiders, deviant 
monsters, or savage animals. Accordingly, those who fit the profile of a golden boy are 
commonly taken to be the kind of person who could do no wrong, for the very 
meaning—what it is to be a golden boy in this social context—precludes this. It’s 
creepy strangers and deviant monsters who rape women; golden boys are “good 
guys”; they’re in the Eagle Scouts and are awarded swimming scholarships. These 
two concepts—golden boy and rapist—when embedded into certain social 
environments, are susceptible to be construed as opposites or as clashing.  
 
6. Hermeneutical Defeat and Pre-emption  
A hermeneutical resource can be collectively available yet fail to get applied in 
socially significant contexts where it matters the most. Other distorting concepts may 
defeat or pre-empt the application of an available and more accurate concept. <17> To 
develop this idea further, let’s return to the Turner case. Because the concept golden 
boy readily applied to Turner, this functioned for some as a strong defeater for, or may 
have altogether pre-empted, his classification as a rapist. This is partly due to the fact 
that the golden boy is distorting. It purports to justify and supports the legitimization 
of oppressive social practices, namely, practices which sustain and reinforce elite 
white male dominance by portraying such men as incapable wrongdoing, and hence, 
as incapable of rape. <18> Couple this with the misguided, yet all too common, 
depiction of rapists as strangers, creeps, savage animals, and unhinged monsters, and 
you get the perfect hermeneutical storm: golden boys simply couldn’t be rapists. 
Hence, even if one was (more or less) conceptually competent with the concept rapist, 
one may still fail to identify actual rapists as such in particular instances owing to 
hermeneutical defeat or pre-emption.  
Thus, we need to be attentive to not only the initial conceptual dissemination and 
acquisition of a hermeneutical resource, but also the broader social environments in 
which a concept is operationalized and implemented. We need to consider how 
hermeneutical resources interact with each other when embedded into certain social 
contexts with entrenched social conventions and background ideologies (e.g., sexism, 
racism, classism, xenophobia, ableism, transphobia, heteronormativity, capitalism, 
and so on), especially when such background social environments are partly 
constituted and reinforced by the widespread use of oppressive distorting concepts 
and controlling images. 
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In a social context where distorting images like the golden boy are widespread and 
reinforced by dominant narratives and social scripts it becomes increasingly hard to 
meaningfully apply the concept rapist to individuals, like Turner, who fit the mold of 
a golden boy. So, while the needed concept rapist may exist in the dominant 
hermeneutical inventory, it is prone to unwarranted defeat and pre-emption. What’s 
more, those who attempt to apply this concept to individual like Turner, as Miller did, 
are far less likely to be believed, and thus are less able to share their crucially important 
knowledge. This, in turn, will limit the concept’s productive function and influence in 
society—the concept is unable to robustly latch on to the social world in a way that 
can stimulate and support social and political progress.  
Contrary to what a lacuna-centered framework suggests, filling in hermeneutical 
gaps and garnering collective conceptual competence—while undeniably important—
is not enough to overcome hermeneutical injustice. Conceptual competence does not 
ensure the accurate application of a concept, especially in high-stakes social contexts 
where privileged groups stand to gain from conceptual distortion and oppressive 
ideological practices. The application of the needed concept may be defeated or pre-
empted when pernicious background ideologies and social practices dictate that some 
other opposing and distorting concept is more applicable. Hence, even if the concept 
is available and widely used across social groups and communities, this is not enough 
to secure its accurate application, and importantly, not enough to reap the productive 
value of the concept in important social contexts.   
 Let’s take stock. So far, I have outlined the productive function and power of 
hermeneutical resources—how they serve to organize members of society and how 
some distorting concepts or controlling images purport to justify and normalize unjust 
social arrangements. This drew our attention to an important and often overlooked 
value of hermeneutical resources, namely, their productive value and potential to 
support social and political change. Thus, the value of hermeneutical resources is at 
least two-fold: they have productive as well as interpretive value. Recognizing this, in 
turn, helped to uncover a species of hermeneutical injustice, which does not result 
from a hermeneutical deficiency or gap. Reflecting upon concrete examples of 
hermeneutical injustice without lacunae made salient a critical need to consider how 
concepts are operationalized within a given social milieu—how they combine with 
other extant concepts and how they are integrated into pre-existing hermeneutical 
frameworks. The need for this is especially pressing when extant hermeneutical 
frameworks contain negative controlling images and oppressive distorting concepts. 
Such concepts have the potential to crowd out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of 
an available and more accurate hermeneutical resource.  
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 In the next section, I begin to develop a more expansive and more socially 
situated framework for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice—an approach that 
aims to accommodate cases of hermeneutical injustice both with and without 
hermeneutical gaps.   
 
7. A More Expansive Framework 
7.1 Positive and Negative Hermeneutical Injustice  
Why should we think that the cases described thus far capture a distinct species of 
hermeneutical injustice? Recall that according to Fricker the primary harm of 
hermeneutical injustice:  
…consists in a situated hermeneutical inequality: the concrete situation is such 
that the subject is rendered unable to make communicatively intelligible 
something which it is particularly in his or her interests to be able to render 
intelligible. (Fricker 2007, 162) 
We can break down Fricker’s analysis more precisely as requiring the following 
necessary conditions. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when: (i) one’s experience fails 
to be intelligible (either to oneself or to others), (ii) the hermeneutical tools need to 
make one’s experience intelligible are not collective shared by those in the relevant 
social context, and (iii) this is due to a lacuna in the collective hermeneutical repertoire 
resulting from one’s hermeneutical marginalization.  
Consider the perspective of Chanel Miller, the survivor in the Turner case. 
Miller was clearly in a position to render her experience intelligible—she wasn’t 
hindered in her ability to understand that she was a victim of rape. This was 
unmistakably and painfully obvious to her. Others, however, were reluctant, or 
altogether failed, to apply the concept rapist to Turner. This, of course, is not to say 
that such individuals lacked the concept rapist; this concept was available and 
intelligible to them. Instead, others failed to accurately apply this concept to Turner 
because he exemplified many of the hallmarks of a golden boy. So, while others could 
render intelligible the fact that Miller and her defence team were accusing Turner of 
rape, they failed to apply the concept rapist to Turner due to the presence of distorting 
and oppressive concepts.  
Let’s return to the three conditions needed to establish a hermeneutical injustice 
on Fricker’s lacuna-centered analysis. Given that the concept rapist  was intelligible to 
Miller and those in the relevant social context, and moreover, given that the concept 
rapist was broadly available in the hermeneutical repertoire at large (there was no 
lacuna), this case does not satisfy any of the three conditions. So, according to the 
lacuna-centred framework, it follows that Miller isn’t a victim of hermeneutical 
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injustice. Is this the right result? It would be a serious mistake to draw this conclusion. 
Instead, cases like these highlight a need to revise and expand upon the analysis of 
hermeneutical injustice and the range of harms that it may give rise to.  
Defenders of a lacuna-centered framework are right to note that across a range 
of cases the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice concerns an inability to make an 
important social experience intelligible (either to oneself or to others). However, this 
is not the sole way in which hermeneutical injustice can manifest. The hermeneutical 
injustice that Miller faced didn’t involve a lack of intelligibly, but instead resulted from 
a failure of conceptual application or conceptual aptness. Others were reluctant to 
apply the concept rapist to Turner because they didn’t view this concept as fitting or 
appropriate for a man like him. Furthermore, this failure of application doesn’t trace 
back to any hermeneutical gap. It’s the very opposite: it was due to the positive 
presence of distorting and oppressive concepts which served to prop up Turner’s 
innocence and to prevent the concept rapist from applying to him. Taken in this way, 
we can explain Miller as having suffered a kind of hermeneutical injustice, not due to 
a lack of intelligibility, but due to the fact that others in her social context were unable 
to accurately apply the concept rapist to Turner owing to the presence of oppressive 
concepts. This, in turn, resulted in the denial of Miller’s creditability and thus 
diminished her status as a knower—specifically as a contributor of important and 
socially significant knowledge—in the given social context.  
Reflecting upon these features of Miller’s situation suggests a more expansive 
framework for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. This framework 
encompasses the explanatory successes of the lacuna-centered analysis, while also 
capturing an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn’t result from 
lacunae or failures of intelligibility. According to this broader approach, 
hermeneutical injustice can manifest in at least two distinct ways, what we might call 
positive hermeneutical injustice and negative hermeneutical injustice. Negative 
hermeneutical injustice is the more familiar kind of injustice that is captured by the 
lacuna-centred account. It’s negative because at its core it results from a lack of 
hermeneutical resources. A paradigm example being the much-discussed case of 
Carmita Wood and the absence of the concept sexual harassment. In cases of negative 
hermeneutical injustice, the primary harm consists in an inability to render important 
social experiences intelligible (either to oneself or to others). <19> 
On the other hand, positive hermeneutical injustice results from the presence of 
oppressive and distorting concepts which crowd out, defeat, or pre-empt the 
application of an available and more accurate concept. Positive hermeneutical 
injustice is the kind of injustice exhibited in Miller’s case and the failure to apply the 
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concept rapist to Turner, given that he fits the profile of a golden boy. Due to the 
hermeneutical marginalization of certain groups—specifically, the unequal authority 
and power concerning not just the initial creation and dissemination of conceptual 
resources, but also their revision, reinforcement, and overall influence and 
applicability in high-stakes social contexts—oppressive concepts remain operative 
within one’s social milieu. In cases of positive hermeneutical injustice, the primary 
harm concerns a failure of conceptual aptness or applicability which results from 
oppressive concepts limiting or altogether blocking the accurate application of a 
concept. This can result in one’s  diminished status as a knower in the relevant context, 
and more specifically, as a giver of knowledge.  
It is important to emphasize the epistemic dimensions of positive 
hermeneutical injustice. This injustice is epistemic insofar as it involves an 
unwarranted infringement and limitation upon one’s capacity to contribute 
knowledge in a socially significant context. In Miller’s case, the presence of distorting 
and oppressive concepts functioned to significantly undermine her creditability and 
thus her capacity to contribute knowledge with respect to a crucially important subject 
matter. While everyone could understand her accusation against Turner, many 
nonetheless failed to gain knowledge as a result of her testimony. Distorting and 
oppressive concepts functioned as defeaters, or altogether pre-empted, the uptake of 
her testimony and undercut her attempt to classify Turner as a rapist.  
This broader framework for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice gives rise 
to a host of new and interesting questions concerning the relationship between 
hermeneutical and testimonial injustice. Fricker discusses the connection between 
(negative) hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice on the lacuna-centered 
model as follows:  
…testimonial injustice becomes not simply likely but almost inescapable 
when the persistence of hermeneutical gaps renders certain voices less 
intelligible (and hence less creditable) than other on certain matters, and 
their attempts to articulate certain meanings are systematically regarded as 
nonsensical (and hence incredible). (Fricker 2007, 159. Also, cf. Medina 
2012, 96).  
Relatedly, we can begin to understand how positive hermeneutical injustice impinges 
upon the creditability of testifiers. When speakers offer testimony which is 
incongruous with the oppressive concepts operative within their social milieu, their 
testimony is more easily prone to defeat and pre-emption. As a result, one’s testimony 
is less likely to gain uptake and to be believed.  
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It is also important to acknowledge a further series of secondary and more 
practical harms that Miller confronted as a result of positive hermeneutical injustice. 
We can understand the failure to apply the concept rapist to Turner as symptomatic of 
an overall failure of operationalization—a failure to effectively integrate a 
hermeneutical resource into a broader social milieu owing, in part, to the presence of 
oppressive concepts in the dominant hermeneutical repertoire. As a result, the 
productive function and value of this concept—its potential to support meaningful 
social and political change—is significantly diminished across a range of important 
socio-political contexts as is evidenced by the lenient jail sentence given to Turner.  
Once a concept is introduced into collective understanding, this will facilitate 
intelligibility in the form of conceptual competence (i.e. a lacuna no longer persists), 
but, as I’ve argued, this does not guarantee that the concept will actually be used and 
applied in important and socially significant scenarios. In particular, it does not 
guarantee that the needed concept is immune from unwarranted defeated or pre-
emption by a oppressive controlling image or distorting concept which is operative in 
one’s social milieu. Overcoming negative forms of hermeneutical injustice—by filling 
in hermeneutical lacunae—does not entail that positive forms of hermeneutical 
injustice will be guarded against and rectified as well. Hermeneutical injustice isn’t 
overcome unless hermeneutical resources which accurately depict social reality 
robustly gain an influential and authoritative grip on the social world—a grip which 
positively influences and improves the lives of those in marginalized communities. 
Only then can hermeneutical resources support meaningful change in helping to 
reform our social and political landscapes for the better. The sheer existence of a 
concept, even if it has been disseminated both intra and inter communally, while 
vitally important, is not enough to ensure this.  
Theorizing about hermeneutical injustice using this more expansive 
framework helps us to reveal significant limits of a lacunae-centered model by 
illustrating how hermeneutical injustice may persist well after lacunae are filled. 
Additionally, an expansive framework supports a characterization of hermeneutical 
injustice as an appropriately social phenomenon by highlighting the overarching social 
environments in which hermeneutical resources are embedded and implemented. A 
more expansive framework—one that recognizes both positive and negative forms of 
hermeneutical injustice—is more complete and possess more explanatory depth to the 
extent that it acknowledges the aptness or applicability of socially significant concepts 




This expansive framework also has important connections to Pohlhaus’ 
analysis of willful hermeneutical ignorance, as well as Dotson’s account of contributory 
injustice. Recall that willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs when dominantly situated 
knowers refuse to acquire the hermeneutical tools of those from marginalized groups, 
and, as a result, sustain hermeneutical lacunae at the level of the dominant (or inter-
communal) hermeneutical repertoire. On a more expansive approach, we can begin to 
describe a phenomenon adjacent to willful hermeneutical ignorance. Even after a 
concept is collectively available, that is, even after the dominantly situated have 
acquired the concepts needed to make the experiences of marginalized members of 
society intelligible, they may still willfully refuse to adopt the proper application 
conditions for such concepts. This will directly impact the overall productive function 
and value of such concepts within one’s social milieu. In such cases, those in dominant 
positions may acknowledge, acquire, and even widely utilize a concept––yet they may 
refuse to apply it in particular situations due to their continued use of controlling 
images and oppressive distorting concepts.   
In a related vein, recall Dotson’s notion of contributory injustice which occurs 
when, because of willful hermeneutical ignorance, the dominantly situated refuse to 
adopt the hermeneutical resources of those from marginalized groups and instead use 
other, often prejudiced, resources instead. When this happens, the epistemic agency 
of marginalized individuals is frustrated and undermined; they are unable to 
positively contribute to the dominant hermeneutical repertoire. In light of the more 
expansive framework, we can begin to explain a related way in which the epistemic 
agency of marginalized groups may be compromised. This happens when the 
dominantly situated fail to properly apply and utilize a socially significant concept 
accurately and for its intended productive purposes. Systematic failures of conceptual 
application, particularly when this is the result of endorsing and maintaining the use 
of oppressive concepts or controlling images, can serve to undermine the epistemic 
agency of marginalized individuals insofar as it limits their capacity to influence how 
hermeneutical resources are implemented and utilized within a social milieu. When this 
happens, marginalized individuals are unjustly undermined in their ability to 
contribute hermeneutical resources with robust productive value and influence, that 
is, resources which are able to effectively support social and political change.  
Oftentimes, when disadvantaged communities develop hermeneutical 
resources, they do so not only because they are valuable interpretive tools needed to 
understand and communicate their experiences, but also because they are vital 
productive resources which are needed to help improve their material circumstances. 
The hope is that these resources will be accurately and effectively utilized in order to 
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improve the lives of individuals within these communities (e.g., to help survivors of 
sexual violence). However, if members of society continue to engage in oppressive 
social practices, specifically, those which make use of and reinforce the influence of 
oppressive controlling images and distorting concepts, then these hermeneutical 
contributions will be significantly diminished.  
 
7.2 Hermeneutical Justice  
What might it take to overcome hermeneutical injustice? A more expansive 
framework suggests that hermeneutical justice requires more than filling in 
hermeneutical lacunae. More plausibly, combating hermeneutical injustice demands 
collective social movements aimed at disrupting and reforming dominant conceptual 
frameworks and social scripts. Hence, it’s not only important to develop and widely 
disseminate novel concepts needed to understand socially significant experiences. But 
equally (if not more) important is unlearning and dislodging the distorting ideological 
grip of controlling images and oppressive concepts that are operative within one’s 
social milieu.  
This is unlikely to be effective if done piecemeal, individual by individual, 
concept by concept. Instead, hermeneutical justice is more likely achieved with 
collective social action–– movements which center the voices and experiences of 
marginalized individuals and which aim to disrupt and expose systemic patters of 
oppression and exploitation. <20> We can look to the gay rights movement and the 
fight for marriage equality in North America as an illustrative example. The concept 
marriage is now (to a great extent) routinely applied to gay couples in social and legal 
context. This movement helped to support the intelligibility of gay marriage, but 
additionally, it enabled gay couples to enjoy benefits and privileges afforded by legal 
unions (e.g., health insurance benefits, immigration and residency benefits, social 
security programs, and so on). Having marriage readily apply to gay couples was 
productively powerful—it helped to improve the material conditions of many gay 
couples across North America. 
Another example is the #BodyPositivity movement, which has gained a global 
online following over the past decade (Baker 2015, Crabbe 2017, Taylor 2018). The 
overarching mission of this movement is to combat mainstream narratives which 
promote unhealthy and downright unattainable standards of beauty, body image, and 
health, primarily targeting young women and girls. By centering bodies which are 
marginalized in mainstream media—disabled bodies, fat bodies, and bodies of color—
and with slogans like “‘Fat’ is not a bad word” (Shackelford 2019) and artists like Cinta 
Tort Cartró who embraces the beauty of stretch marks by painting them vibrant colors 
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(Park 2017), this movement aims to problematize dominant social assumptions and 
narratives which deem fatness and other marginalized body features to be a cause for 
embarrassment, shame, or inferiority. <21> 
Combating hermeneutical injustice is thus not simply a matter of filling in 
hermeneutical gaps. Hermeneutical justice demands something much more radical 
and far reaching. More plausibly, it demands large-scale social movements aimed at 
dismantling oppressive ideologies and social practices. Without question, part of this 
will involve cultivating and propagating novel conceptual resources—e.g., concepts 
like genderqueer, disability pride, body positivity, and sexual harassment—that is, it will 
require filling in hermeneutical lacunae. But, as we’ve seen, much more is needed 
beyond this to sufficiently guard against and rectify the harms of hermeneutical 
injustice. 
So, where does this leave us? In closing, I want to emphasize what I take to be the 
best way forward in theorizing about hermeneutical injustice, and epistemic injustice 
more broadly. The main thrust is this: we need to broaden our horizons and engage 
in a more socially embedded way. <22> Contrasting cases of positive compared to 
negative hermeneutical injustice serves to illustrates how concepts don’t exist and 
operate independently from one another, but are deeply interconnected. The 
productive value of hermeneutical tools is both constrained and enabled by their place 
alongside other concepts within an overarching social milieu. Moreover, the sheer fact 
that many concepts were and still are needed to make sense of the socially significant 
experiences of marginalized communities should be incredibly suggestive of the 
current state of collective hermeneutical frameworks and the strong influence of 
unjust social practices and oppressive concepts and controlling images therein.  
It is thus imperative that we pay close attention to how concepts can function to 
sustain and promote pernicious background ideologies and unjust social 
arrangements, and how this in turn can restrict the productive function and power of 
liberatory concepts, both old and new. The intelligibility gained from the introduction 
and widespread dissemination of a hermeneutical resource is undeniably important. 
However, this is just one dimension of hermeneutical progress that ought not distract 
us from others. We must also recognize the productive function and value of 
hermeneutical resources and how they come to be deemed appliable and utilized, or 
more importantly not appliable and not utilized, across diverse social environments.  
Successfully overcoming hermeneutical injustice likely requires full-fledged social 
movements—it requires organization, mobilization, and activism. It requires 
challenging and disrupting the status quo narrative and dislodging ingrained 
assumptions and ideologies which normalize and purport to justify oppressive social 
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arrangements. When a hermeneutical resource, which is needed to understand the 
experiences of disadvantaged groups, is introduced into the collective hermeneutical 
repertoire, this is clearly a move in the right direction—it is progress towards 
hermeneutical justice. However, if prevailing social conditions aren’t conducive to the 
concept’s gaining a meaningful grip on the world—that is, to its being broadly applied 
in important social contexts where it accurately describes social reality and where it 
stands to do productive work to help improve the material conditions of those in 
marginalized communities—the concept’s potential to combat hermeneutical injustice 
will be undermined. Contrary to what a lacuna-centered analysis suggests, filling in 
hermeneutical gaps is not enough to ensure hermeneutical justice; this is just one part 
of a much broader, comprehensive, and socially embedded process.  
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1. Hermeneutical resources include interpretive tools such as: tropes, narratives, 
stories, scripts, and concepts. For simplicity, and following much of the 
literature, I will talk mostly in terms of conceptual resources. 
2. This requirement is argued for in Fricker (2006, 2007, 2016, 2017). This 
assumption has been endorsed widely in recent literature. See for example, 
Beeby (2011), Medina (2011, 2012, 2017), Dotson (2012, 2014), Anderson (2017), 
Goetez (2017), Toole (2019), Vasilyeva and Ayala-López (2019), Dembroff 
(2020), Dembroff and Whitcomb (Forthcoming). 
3. Thank you to an anonymous referee for suggesting this terminology.  
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4. Fricker draws from Brownmiller’s (1990) memoir of the Women’s Liberation 
Movement in the 1960s when discussing the case of Carmit Wood. For other 
early uses of the concept sexual harassment see Rowe (1973) and Nemy (1975). 
5. In later work, Fricker (2016, 173) appears to remain committed to this proposal: 
“it cannot be a hermeneutical injustice without at least some impoverishment in 
shared conceptual resources” (italics added). Also, cf. Fricker (2017, 54). 
6. Criticisms of Fricker’s (2007) analysis of hermeneutical injustice have pointed 
out a failure to distinguish between intra and inter-communal dissemination of 
hermeneutical resources. See, for example, Mason (2011) and Medina (2012, 
2013). It is worth noting that even the inter/intra communal dissemination 
distinction is fairly idealized. The boundaries here are undoubtedly not as crisp 
as this distinction might suggests. For a related discussion, also see Atkins’ 
(2018) distinction between resistant understanding and dominant or collective 
understanding.   
7. In developing her analysis of controlling images, Collins (1986) cites the work 
of King (1973) and Gilkes (1981). In discussing the work of these two scholars, 
Collins notes that:   
King suggests that stereotypes represent externally-defined, controlling 
images of Afro-American womanhood that have been central to the 
dehumanization of Black women and the exploitation of Black women’s 
labor. Gilkes points out that Black women’s assertiveness in resisting the 
multifaceted oppression they experience has been a consistent threat to 
the status quo. As punishment, Black women have been assaulted with 
a variety of externally-defined negative images designed to control 
assertive Black female behavior. The value of King’s and Gilkes’ 
analyses lies in their emphasis on the function of stereotypes in controlling 
dominated groups. (17, italics added)   
8. Note: as was mentioned previously, this does not necessarily mean that Black 
women are unable to develop and use hermeneutic resources intra-
communally. 
9. We can also compare similar influential rhetoric during WWII that described 
Jewish people as “vermin.” For example, this language is prevalent in The 
Eternal Jew, a 1940 Nazi propaganda film. For further discussions on the 
productive function of pernicious social concepts see, for example, Young 
(1990, Chapter 2) on cultural imperialism, Kukla (2018) on the relationship 
between slurs and ideology, and Neufeld (2019) on slurs and essentialization.  
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10. It is also important to note that “monstrosity” and “animality” are also deeply 
racialized notions in a United States context, associated primarily with Black 
people and people of color. Consider, for example, the rhetoric surrounding the 
“Central Park Five” case of 1989 where five Black teenagers were wrongfully 
accused of raping a white woman who was jogging in Central Park. These boys 
were described as a “wolf pack”, “animals”, “blood thirsty”, “savages”, and 
“wilding” (Hinton 2019).    
11. At the time of the trial, the victim’s name was kept anonymous and listed under 
“Emily Doe”. However, Chanel Miller has recently shared her story with the 
broader public in a memoir: Know My Name (2019). 
12. This letter was last accessed here: 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2852615-Stanford-Victim-Letter-
Impact-Statement-From.html 
13. Cf. Manne (2017, 194). Manne’s discussion of the Brock Turner case engages 
primarily with Fricker’s (2007) account of testimonial injustice, a kind of 
epistemic injustice wherein a testifier’s report fails to gain uptake owing to an 
identity prejudice that the testimonial recipient has against the testifier. It’s 
noteworthy that Fricker (2007) focuses primarily upon creditability deficits 
when developing her analysis of testimonial injustice (i.e. giving too little credit 
to a testifier because of an identity prejudice that one has against them). 
However, recent scholarship has persuasively argued that creditability 
surpluses—giving a testifier too much credit owing to some prejudice—can also 
perpetuate testimonial injustice. See Medina (2012), Davis (2016), and Lackey 
(2018, 2020) for further defenses of this point.  
14. Parts of this passage are quoted and discussed in Manne (2020, 38). See Manne 
(2020, Chapter 3) for an insightful further discussion of this case.  
15. Another telling example concerns how Muslim men who commit violent acts 
against civilians are routinely labelled terrorists across United States media 
channels. But, when non-Muslim white men commit nearly identical acts their 
behaviour is routinely attributed to non-essential features of their psychology 
(e.g., mental illness) or exogenous features of their environment (e.g., poor 
childhood upbringing or a bad neighbourhood). White terrorists are typically 
interpreted as hapless victims of circumstance and as not acting in accordance 
with their “real” selves. Across many cases, in a North American context, being 
a white man can, and often does, undermine one’s classification as a terrorist—
even when one has committed blatant terrorist acts. See Kunst et al. (2018) for 
further discussion. This relates to what psychologists have called the 
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“Fundamental Attribution Error.” For further discussion see, for example, 
Sarah-Jane Leslie’s (2017) work on generics and essentialization.  
16. Cf. Haslanger (2020b), who draws upon Yalcin (2016), when defending the 
view that the content of a concept is a partition of logical space. To possess a 
concept, in her view, is to have a disposition which responds to that partition 
in certain ways. However, one’s ability to attend to the partition correctly (i.e. 
to separate the X’s from the non-X’s) may vary depending upon a number of 
factors. Haslanger provides the following illustrative case.   
For example, we may have the same concept of cat – the 
informational content of the concept cat is the same for each of us – 
but our possession of it occurs in somewhat different ways so that 
certain inferences are more direct for me than they are for you, or 
that I am more ready to apply the concept than you. Or it may be 
that because you know more about cats, you have a sensitivity to 
different kinds of cat, so your partition of logical space is more fine-
grained. (240)  
This analysis helps to capture the idea merely possessing or being competent 
with a concept is not, and usually isn’t, an indication that the individual can 
accurately apply the concept across all cases (i.e. that they have a perfect ability 
to sort the X’s from the non-X’s).   
17. Cf. Begby’s (2020) analysis of evidential preemption in the context of testimonial 
exchange, especially what he calls “epistemic grooming.” 
18. Maitra (2018) outlines different ways in which concepts might be distorting 
using the concepts statutory rape and sexual harassment as case studies. I hope to 
remain neutral on the ways in which concepts might be distorting; I believe 
that the phenomena in question are diverse and complex. Offering a taxonomy 
of the various ways in which concepts distort social reality is beyond the scope 
of this paper, however, Maitra’s work is helpful in outlining two potential ways 
this happens: through eliciting inappropriate inferences or eliciting 
inappropriate analogies. Also see Jenkins (2017) for a related and illuminating 
discussion of the relationship between rape myths and hermeneutical injustice. 
Jenkins considers cases where a victim of rape is unable to understand her 
experience as rape owning to operative and distorting rape myths. 
19. It is important to note that in some cases of negative hermeneutical injustice, 
the presence of negative controlling images might very well serve to sustain 
and reinforce hermeneutical lacunae. In classifying this species of 
hermeneutical injustice as negative I don’t want to in any way to rule out this 
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possibility. Cf. Doston’s (2012) related discussion of contributory injustice. 
These two categories—negative and positive—are somewhat idealized, and in 
practice the lines between them might be fuzzy and imprecise. Moreover, once 
we consider the broader relationship and interaction among hermeneutical 
resources within a social context, we might find cases that involve 
combinations of both positive and negative forms of hermeneutical injustice. I 
don’t mean to rule out this potential either. Teasing apart the details here is an 
important project that merits further careful investigation, but which is beyond 
the scope of the paper. 
20. Fricker (2007) acknowledges the important role of social movements and 
political change in challenging the conditions that give rise to hermeneutical 
injustice, namely, in challenging hermeneutical marginalization, but she 
doesn’t wholly embrace this as a necessary component of combating 
hermeneutical injustice itself.  She says:  
Shifting the unequal relations of power that create the conditions of 
hermeneutical injustice (namely, hermeneutical marginalization) 
takes more than virtuous individual conduct of any kind; it takes 
group political action for social change. The primary ethical role for the 
virtue of hermeneutical justice, then, remains one of mitigating the 
negative impact of hermeneutical injustice on the speaker. From the 
point of view of social change, this may be but a drop in the ocean; still, 
from the point of view of the individual hearer’s virtue, not to 
mention the individual speaker’s experience of their exchange, it is 
justice enough. (174-175, italics added.) 
However, once the productive function of hermeneutical resources is brought 
to the fore, I hope we can begin to marshal persuasive reasons why, individual 
level interventions focusing on intelligibility are unlikely to be “justice enough” 
when it comes to combating hermeneutical injustice.   
21. A few major beauty brands have slowly begun to take notice and have shown 
some signs of change for the better, but there is without question a long way 
to go. See for example Dove’s Self Esteem Project: 
https://www.dove.com/us/en/dove-self-esteem-project/our-mission.html. 
22. Anderson (2012), Dotson (2012, 2014), Haslanger (2016, 2020a, 2020b), 
Vasilyeva  and Ayala-López (2019), and  Pohlhaus (2020), among others, have 
also emphasized the importance of thinking about whole social systems and 
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